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韩刚老师中级面授班授课实录

韩刚：毕业于外交学院英语翻译理论与实践专业，曾以优异成绩考入外交部翻译室接受培训，后调任新闻司担任新闻发言人同传；曾为国际大型会议担任同传逾百场，口译实战经验颇丰。 作为B2A口译系统教学法创始人，自2003年起潜心钻研口译培训，注重系统传授，教学踏实认真，方法科学得当，现已在北京翻译培训界独树一帜，是深得广大学员尊重和爱戴的口笔译资深权威讲师。

马茜老师初级面授班授课实录

马茜：北京外国语大学毕业，师从韩刚老师，一次性获得人事部二级口、笔译证书及教育部中级口译证书，现为天之聪教育口译讲师。

Nuclear proliferation
核扩散

Bombing Iran
轰炸伊朗

Nobody should welcome the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. But bombing the place is not the answer
应该没有人支持一个在未来拥有核武器的伊朗，但轰炸伊朗不是解决之道
 

FOR years Iran has practised denial and deception; it has blustered and played for time. All the while, it has kept an eye on the day when it might be able to build a nuclear weapon. The world has negotiated with Iran; it has balanced the pain of economic sanctions with the promise of reward if Iran unambiguously forsakes the bomb. All the while, outside powers have been able to count on the last resort of a military assault.

数年来，伊朗一直在矢口否认，欺骗隐瞒；同时又在虚张声势，运用缓兵之计。它始终热切期盼制造出核武器的这天的到来。世界一直在试图与伊朗谈判；并且将经济制裁带来的痛苦和伊朗一旦明确放弃核武器将会获得奖励这一承诺加以平衡。同时，外部势力心里有数，实在不行他们还有最后一道杀手锏可用——军事打击。

Today this stand-off looks as if it is about to fail. Iran has continued enriching uranium. It is acquiring the technology it needs for a weapon. Deep underground, at Fordow, near the holy city of Qom, it is fitting out a uranium-enrichment plant that many say is invulnerable to aerial attack. Iran does not yet seem to have chosen actually to procure a nuclear arsenal, but that moment could come soon. Some analysts, especially in Israel, judge that the scope for using force is running out. When it does, nothing will stand between Iran and a bomb.

如今这种僵局即将要打破。伊朗持续不断地在进行铀浓缩活动，正在掌握这项用来制造核武器的技术。位于圣城库姆附近的福尔多铀浓缩工厂即将投入运行，该工厂位于地下深处，并且据许多人表示还可防止空袭。看起来伊朗还没有真正拥有一个核军火库，但离那一刻已经不远了。某些分析人士认为，特别是以色列人士，动用武力成功进行遏制的可能性正在减少。一旦武力解决的可能性消失，将没有什么可以阻止伊朗获得核武器。

The air is thick with the prophecy of war. Leon Panetta, America’s defence secretary, has spoken of Israel attacking as early as April. Others foresee an Israeli strike designed to drag in Barack Obama in the run-up to America’s presidential vote, when he will have most to lose from seeming weak.

坊间处处到处流传着战争的预言。美国国防部长里昂•帕内塔曾提到过最早在去年四月以色列就可能动武。其他人预见到以色列的袭击是精心设计的，专门为了把处于总统大选中的奥巴马拖进来，这样一来他支持以色列的可能性最大，因为显得对伊朗软弱将会影响他的选情。

A decision to go to war should be based not on one man’s electoral prospects, but on the argument that war is warranted and likely to succeed. Iran’s intentions are malign and the consequences of its having a weapon would be grave. Faced by such a regime you should never permanently forswear war. However, the case for war’s success is hard to make. If Iran is intent on getting a bomb, an attack would delay but not stop it. Indeed, using Western bombs as a tool to prevent nuclear proliferation risks making Iran only more determined to build a weapon—and more dangerous when it gets one.

是否发动战争不应该基于某个人的竞选前景而定，而应该根据发动战争的必要性以及战争成功的可能性而定。伊朗的意图非常邪恶，一旦拥有了核武器，其带来的后果必定更加严重。面对这样一个政权，永远无法放弃武力。然而，要想靠发动战争说服伊朗是很难的。如果伊朗有意拥有核武器，军事打击只会拖延它的野心，但却无法阻止。诚然，西方世界希望借助武力打击以阻止核扩散的尝试，只会让伊朗更加坚定制造核武器，而且会让伊朗获得核武器后的局面更加危险。

A shadow over the Middle East

中东魅影

Make no mistake, an Iran armed with the bomb would pose a deep threat. The country is insecure, ideological and meddles in its neighbours’ affairs. Both Iran and its proxies—including Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza—might act even more brazenly than they do now. The danger is keenly felt by Israel, surrounded by threats and especially vulnerable to a nuclear bomb because it is such a small land. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, recently called the “Zionist regime” a “cancerous tumour that must be cut out”. Jews, of all people, cannot just dismiss that as so much rhetoric.

毫无疑问，拥有核武器的伊朗会有更大的威胁。该国局势不稳，宗教思想占据重要地位，还干涉邻国事务。伊朗和其代理人——黎巴嫩的真主党和加沙的军事组织哈马斯——甚至会比如今更加肆无忌惮。以色列——领土面积狭小，对核武器攻击不堪一击，身处众多威胁当中——真真切切地感受到了这股危险。伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉•赛义德•阿里•哈梅内伊最近把“犹太复国主义政权”比作一个“必须被切除的毒瘤”。犹太人，甚至所有人都包括在内，不会对这样的言辞无动于衷。

Even if Iran were to gain a weapon only for its own protection, others in the region might then feel they need weapons too. Saudi Arabia has said it will arm—and Pakistan is thought ready to supply a bomb in exchange for earlier Saudi backing of its own programme. Turkey and Egypt, the other regional powers, might conclude they have to join the nuclear club. Elsewhere, countries such as Brazil might see nuclear arms as vital to regional dominance, or fear that their neighbours will.

虽然伊朗称拥有核武器只是为了自我保护，那么，该区域的其它国家同样会认为他们也需要拥有核武器。沙特阿拉伯已经声明会寻求核武器——据说为报答之前沙特对巴基斯坦核项目的支持，巴基斯坦也许准备送给沙特一颗原子弹。土耳其，埃及以及这一地区的其它势力也会做出同样决定，加入到拥有核武器的“大家庭”。其它地区，像巴西这样的国家也会认为拥有核武器是成为区域霸主的重要一点，或者害怕它们的邻国会获取核武器。

Some experts argue that nuclear-armed states tend to behave responsibly. But imagine a Middle East with five nuclear powers riven by rivalry and sectarian feuds. Each would have its fingers permanently twitching over the button, in the belief that the one that pressed first would be left standing. Iran’s regime gains legitimacy by demonising foreign powers. The cold war seems stable by comparison with a nuclear Middle East—and yet America and the Soviet Union were sometimes scarily close to Armageddon.

某些专家认为拥有核武器的国家通常表现地会更加富有责任心。但是，假想一下，如果中东，有五个拥有核武器的国家，并且还到处充斥着竞争和宗教矛盾，会是怎样一种景象。每个国家都想把他们的手指一刻不停地放在核按钮上，认为只有率先按下按钮的国家才会最终得以生存。通过丑化外国势力，伊朗政权获得认可。相比较于拥有核武器的中东，冷战看起来还更加稳定——那时，可怕的是，美国和苏联有时几乎就要上演大决战。

The dream of pre-emption

渴望先发制人

No wonder some people want a pre-emptive strike. But military action is not the solution to a nuclear Iran. It could retaliate, including with rocket attacks on Israel from its client groups in Lebanon and Gaza. Terror cells around the world might strike Jewish and American targets. It might threaten Arab oil infrastructure, in an attempt to use oil prices to wreck the world economy. Although some Arab leaders back a strike, most Muslims are unlikely to feel that way, further alienating the West from the Arab spring. Such costs of an attack are easy to overstate, but even supposing they were high they might be worth paying if a strike looked like working. It does not.

毫无疑问，某些人希望采取先发制人的战略。但是动武并不是解决伊朗核问题的明智之举。这可能会招来后者的报复，其在黎巴嫩和加沙地带的盟友会使用大量火箭武器攻击以色列。全球的恐怖势力集团会把犹太人和美国人设成攻击目标。他们还将会威胁毁灭阿拉伯的石油基础设施，尝试利用操纵油价瓦解世界经济。尽管某些阿拉伯领导人支持动武，但多数穆斯林人士不认同那种方式，这会进一步使西方摆脱与阿拉伯之春的干系。很容易高估此类军事打击的代价，但是就算假设代价会非常高，只要武力打击能起到效果，也是值得的。可是情况并非如此。

Striking Iran would be much harder than Israel’s successful solo missions against the weapons programmes of Iraq, in 1981, and Syria, in 2007. If an attack were easy, Israel would have gone in alone long ago, when the Iranian programme was more vulnerable. But Iran’s sites are spread out and some of them, hardened against strikes, demand repeated hits. America has more military options than Israel, so it would prefer to wait. That is one reason why it is seeking to hold Israel back. The other is that, for either air force, predictions of the damage from an attack span a huge range. At worst an Israeli mission might fail altogether, at best an American one could, it is said, set back the programme a decade.

相比较于以色列在1981年和2007年，单兵作战，分别成功挫败了伊拉克和叙利亚的和武器计划，对伊朗动武绝非易事。如果军事打击易于实施，或许以色列一国就早动手了，并且之前伊朗的核计划更易于打击。但是，伊朗的地形分布不均，某些地方易守难攻，需要反复攻击。相比较于以色列，美国有更多的军事进攻手段，所以它宁愿再等等。这就是为什么美国正在竭力劝阻以色列动武的原因。另外，不管是否使用空中打击，估计动武带来的损失都会波及到多个方面。最糟糕的结果就是以色列的打击会彻底夭折，最好的结果，预计就是美国可以将该国的核计划往后拖十年。

But uncertainty would reign. Iran is a vast, populous and sophisticated country with a nuclear programme that began under the shah. It may have secret sites that escape unscathed. Even if all its sites are hit, Iran’s nuclear know-how cannot be bombed out of existence. Nor can its network of suppliers at home and abroad. It has stocks of uranium in various stages of enrichment; an unknown amount would survive an attack, while the rest contaminated an unforeseeable area. Iran would probably withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which its uranium is watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency. At that point its entire programme would go underground—literally and figuratively. If Iran decided it needed a bomb, it would then be able to pursue one with utmost haste and in greater secrecy. Saudi Arabia and the others might conclude that they, too, needed to act pre-emptively to gain their own deterrents.

但是结果的不确定性攸关重要。伊朗是个国土面积庞大，人口众多，各种势力互相交织的国家，其中核计划在伊朗国王统治时期就开始了。该国或许有些秘密的据点，毫发未损。即使所有的据点被攻击，伊朗的核技术也无法被摧毁。其与国内和国外建立的供货商渠道也不会被摧垮。它已经储备了大量处于铀浓缩各个阶段的铀；攻击后不还会有多少浓缩铀幸存下来，而被袭击的浓缩铀会造成多大的地区受到污染也无法预测。伊朗很可能会退出《核不扩散条约》，而在该条约下，其进行的铀浓缩活动会受到国际原子能机构的监管。一旦退出该条约，它所有的核计划都将转入地下——秘密进行。如果未来伊朗决定需要核武器，到时它就能够非常迅速隐蔽地造出核弹。而沙特阿拉伯和其它国家也可能就此得出结论，认为自己也应该先发制人，获取自己的核威慑力。

Perhaps America could bomb Iran every few years. But how would it know when and where to strike? And how would it justify a failing policy to the world? Perhaps, if limited bombing is not enough, America should be aiming for an all-out aerial war, or even regime change. Yet a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated where that leads. An aerial war could dramatically raise the threat of retaliation. Regime change might produce a government that the West could do business with. But the nuclear programme has broad support in Iran. The idea that a bomb is the only defence against an implacable American enemy might become stronger than ever.

或许美国每过几年就可轰一次伊朗。但是它如何决定何时动手，对何地实施打击？它如何向世界证明这个本身失败的政策的合理性？或许一定程度上的轰炸并不足以毁灭伊朗，美国应该借助全方位的空中战争进行打击，或甚至颠覆其政权。但是已经持续十年之久的伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争已经证明了战争最后的结果。空中打击更会引起报复。政权更迭可能也会孕育出一个能与西方做生意的政府。但是核武器计划在伊朗具有广泛的支持。这个观点——只有核武器才能抵抗难以和解的死敌美国——或许会比以往更加强烈。

Get real

回到现实

That does not mean the world should just let Iran get the bomb. The government will soon be starved of revenues, because of an oil embargo. Sanctions are biting, the financial system is increasingly isolated and the currency has plunged in value. Proponents of an attack argue that military humiliation would finish the regime off. But it is as likely to rally Iranians around their leaders. Meanwhile, political change is sweeping across the Middle East. The regime in Tehran is divided and it has lost the faith of its people. Eventually, popular resistance will spring up as it did in 2009. A new regime brought about by the Iranians themselves is more likely to renounce the bomb than one that has just witnessed an American assault.

这并不意味着世界同意伊朗拥有核武器。由于石油禁运，制裁生效，金融体系日益受到孤立，以及货币大幅贬值，伊朗不久就会国库空虚。主张军事打击的人认为军事窘境将会终结现政权。但是军事窘境同样还有可能把伊朗人士团结在他们的领导人周围。与此同时，政权更迭正席卷中东。伊朗政权已经四分五裂，失信于民。最终与2009年的情况一样，民众的反抗会迅速加强。与宁可逼美国动用武力的前政权相比，伊朗人民自己创造的新政权很可能会声明放弃核计划。

Is there a danger that Iran will get a nuclear weapon before that happens? Yes, but bombing might only increase the risk. Can you stop Iran from getting a bomb if it is determined to have one? Not indefinitely, and bombing it might make it all the more desperate. Short of occupation, the world cannot eliminate Iran’s capacity to gain the bomb. It can only change its will to possess one. Just now that is more likely to come about through sanctions and diplomacy than war.

在这一切发生前，伊朗会不会有提前获得核武器的危险？毫无疑问，答案是肯定的，但是诉诸武力很可能只会加剧危险。如果伊朗已经铁了心必须拥有核武器，谁能阻止呢？诚然，动用武力可能只会更加激发它拥有的欲望。除非占领伊朗，否则全球无法阻止该国拥有核武器的能力。世界只能改变它拥有核武器的意志。如今看来，相比较于动用武力，通过制裁和外交措施更有可能做到这一点。

 

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