金融危机给我们的七大教训

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金融危机给我们的七大教训

天之聪教育 2013-05-16 天之聪教育 306次

金融危机给我们的七大教训

Seven Lessons For Fixing An Economy

David Wessel
        A generation ago, unemployment of 7.6% would have been considered a bad recession in the U.S. Now it's a sign of improvement; indeed, many of the international finance ministers gathered in Washington this weekend for their spring meetings envy it. In the 17 countries that share the euro, unemployment is at 12% and rising; it's double that in Spain. The British economy has contracted in 10 of the last 19 quarters.

        在上一代人看来，美国7.6%的失业率是很严重的经济衰退；而如今，它却成为了经济改善的迹象。确实，前不久在华盛顿出席春季会议的各国财长中有许多人都对此心生羡慕。在欧元区的17个成员国中，失业率高达12%而且还在不断攀升，西班牙的失业率更是这个数字的两倍。在过去19个季度中的10个季度，英国的经济一直都在萎缩。

        Is this the best we can do?

        这是我们能做到的最好程度吗？

        Books will be (and have been) written about how to avoid another financial crisis. Debates over who should have been bailed out and who allowed to fail will persist. But here's another issue: What have the past few years taught us about how to speed recovery after an economy suffers a severe financial shock?

        未来会有人（而且已经有人）撰写如何避免金融危机再次发生的书籍，关于原本应该救助谁、应该任由谁破产的争论会持续不休。不过，现在还有另外一个问题：对于一个经济体在遭受严重的金融冲击后该如何加快复苏，过去这些年教给了我们什么教训？

        It's hard to know what might have been. This episode is not yet over, so no one can know the ultimate consequences of what has been done. That said, a few early lessons seem clear:

        我们很难了解情况原本可能会怎样。现在的事件尚未结束，所以没有人能知道已采取的措施将带来的最终结果。即便如此，一些初步的教训似乎还是显而易见的：

        Lesson one: Get the diagnosis right.

        教训之一：作出正确的诊断。

        Ken Rogoff, a Harvard economist who literally wrote the book on the history of financial crises (and whose data about the relationship between public debt and growth were challenged by other economists this week), says the single most important thing to remember is this: 'When you have a recession accompanied by a deep financial crisis, you are in for a long period of slow growth.'

        哈佛大学(Harvard)经济学家肯•罗格夫(Ken Rogoff)写了一本讲述金融危机史的书（其有关公共债务与经济增长之间关联的数据前不久受到了其他经济学家的质疑）。他认为我们要记住的最重要事情是──“当经济衰退还伴随着严重的金融危机时，经济就会陷入长时期的缓慢增长。”

        Ameliorating the acute misery of unemployment and eviction is humane. But this sort of recession is more like a chronic disease. 'If you realize you're not going to grow your way out of it quickly,' says Mr. Rogoff, 'it changes the calculus of risk.' That means doing things that are politically (and perhaps economically) painful in the short-run -- writing off bad debts, for instance -- because they'll pay off later. 'This is really about whether you are going to have slow growth for five years or 15,' he says. Neither the U.S. nor Europe understood this in when the first major financial shocks hit.

        减轻失业和被驱离家园的阵痛是人道之举。然而，眼下这种衰退更像是一种慢性病。罗格夫说，如果你意识到你无法迅速走出衰退，那就需要改变对风险的计算法。这意味着你要做些短期内在政治上（很可能也在经济上）会带来阵痛的事情，比如说注销坏账，因为它们会在日后给你带来回报。罗格夫称：“这实际上关系到经济将缓慢增长五年还是15年。”然而，当第一波主要金融冲击来袭之时，美国和欧洲都没有理解到这一点。

        Lesson two: When in doubt, do more, not less.

        教训之二：心中存疑时，要做的更多，而不是更少。

        This sounds imprudent, particularly given that the crisis was caused by excessive lending, borrowing and risk taking. But recent history demonstrates that initial forecasts are rarely gloomy enough and that bad surprises are more likely to follow a big financial shock than good ones. Since 2009, Federal Reserve officials have been consistently overoptimistic about growth.

        这句话听上去轻率鲁莽，特别是考虑到此次危机就是由过度放贷、借款和冒险所引发的。然而，近期历史表明，最初的预测永远悲观不足，在大规模金融危机爆发后，意外的失望总比惊喜更有可能出现。自2009年以来，美联储(Federal Reserve)的官员就一直对经济增长形势持过分乐观态度。

        If the Fed had it all to do over again, it probably would have done more rate-cutting, money-printing and bond-buying sooner. Most of President Barack Obama's economic advisers would have done more fiscal stimulus if Congress had been amenable.

        假如美联储能够让一切重来的话，它大概会更快采取更多降息、印钞和购买国债的举措。假如国会愿意配合的话，巴拉克•奥巴马总统(Barack Obama)的大多数经济顾问也会制订更多财政刺激方案。

        There is, to be sure, a contrasting view that it wasn't the dosage, but the fiscal medicine itself that was wrong. Recent history doesn't yet provide much support that less stimulus would have been better. The track record of the U.K.'s experiment in fiscal austerity is, so far, unappealing -- slower-than-predicted economic growth despite the efforts of the Bank of England to offset the government's stiff spending cuts.

        当然，也有另一种与此相对立的观点认为，是财政“药方”本身而不是“剂量”出了差错。但关于“刺激越少，情况可能更好”的论点从近期历史中得不到太多支持。例如，迄今为止英国在试行财政紧缩方面的过往表现毫不出色。尽管英国央行采取了种种举措来抵消政府严厉的开支削减措施，但该国经济增长速度还是低于预期。

        Lesson three: A financial crisis is about economics, not morality.

        教训之三：金融危机关系到的是经济学，与道德无关。

        There's a temptation to preach after so many people make so many mistakes: Avoid the sins that created the crisis. Punish the perpetrators. Pursue the economic rectitude of thrift.

        在这么多人犯下如此多的错误之后，大家出现了说教的冲动：要防止造成危机的种种罪恶，惩罚作恶者，在经济上奉行节俭之道。

        In the long run, that's surely right. But in the immediate aftermath of a financial mega-shock, if everyone simultaneously reduces debts, the economy will keep contracting. There's a strong case for encouraging borrowing and spending in the immediate aftermath of a financial crisis and for temporarily putting aside the fear that doing so might lead people to sin more in the future.

        从长远来看，这显然是正确的。然而，在遭受巨大的金融冲击之后，如果每个人都立即同时减少债务，那经济就将一直萎靡下去。强有力的证据显示，在金融危机爆发伊始，应鼓励借款和支出，并暂时把认为这么做可能会使大家未来犯下更多罪恶的忧虑放到一边。

        Lesson four: Mind the banks.

        教训之四：关注银行。

        During the Great Depression, as Ben Bernanke showed in his academic work, the economy suffered from the Federal Reserve's failure to see that dying banks were clogging the credit arteries of the economy. During the 1990s, in cases that Mr. Bernanke examined in the midst of the recent crisis, Sweden and Japan both had wrenching banking crises. Sweden swallowed hard, cleaned up its banks and restored its economy to growth. Japan did not, and stagnated for a decade. During the 2000s, the U.S. learned from that history; Europe did not.

        正如本•贝南克(Ben Bernanke)在其学术著作中所说的那样，在“大萧条”时期，美联储未能认清正是垂死挣扎的银行阻塞了经济的信贷动脉，这种认识错误导致经济受创。贝南克在最近这次危机中又研究了上世纪90年代的情况，当时瑞典和日本双双发生了严重的金融危机。瑞典选择了吃猛药，它整顿银行体系，从而使经济恢复了增长。日本没有做到这一点，其经济也停滞了10年时间。在本世纪头10年，美国从这段历史中吸取了教训，欧洲则没有。

        The contrast between the U.S. and European stress testing of banks is instructive. The point of stress tests is to assure markets that the banks have (or will be forced to raise) enough capital to withstand a bad economy.

        美国与欧洲对银行的压力测试的对比颇具启发意义。压力测试的意义在于让市场确信，银行拥有（或者是将会被迫募集）足够的资本金来抵抗住糟糕的经济。

        In the U.S., the 2009 stress tests proved credible with the markets and the government promised taxpayer capital to banks that couldn't raise what they needed on the markets. European stress tests lacked credibility -- in part because of the delicacy of recognizing that government bonds might not be worth their face value. And European governments still haven't fashioned a convincing backstop for banks that can't raise capital.

        在美国，事实证明2009年的压力测试获得了市场的信任，政府也承诺用纳税人的钱救助无法从市场募集到所需资金的银行。欧洲的压力测试缺乏可信度，其中部分原因在于承认政府债券的价值或许不值其面值是个棘手的事。此外，欧洲各国政府仍然没有形成为无法募集到资金的银行提供支持的令人信服的机制。

        So U.S. banks are widely regarded as healthy, and are beginning to lend more readily. Some major European banks, meanwhile, are still seen as shaky. They're reluctant to lend. And now governments are embarking on yet another round of stress testing.

        如此一来，美国的银行被普遍认为状况良好，并开始更加愿意放贷。与此同时，欧洲一些大银行依然被认为处境岌岌可危，它们也不愿意放贷。现在，各国政府又开始了新一轮压力测试。

        Lesson five: Mind the borrowers, too.

        教训之五：也要关注借贷者。

        If a borrower can't pay back a loan, then pretending he will does neither borrower nor lender any good -- and it can cripple an economy. But the politics of writing off debts, especially at taxpayer expense, can be an insurmountable obstacle.

        假如借款人不能偿还贷款，但却假装能够偿还，这对借款方和出借方都不会有任何好处，这种做法会阻碍经济的发展。但是，注销债务，特别是花的还是纳税人的钱，其中涉及的利害关系会是一个难以逾越的障碍。

        In the U.S., where more than a quarter of homeowners with mortgages had loans larger than the value of their homes, there were calls from economists to refinance lots of mortgages or reduce them. Neither the Bush nor the Obama administrations ever found a vehicle with a payoff that they thought worth the economic and political cost. Their critics say this excessive caution prolonged the housing bust and slowed the recovery.

        在美国，四分之一以上有抵押贷款的房主所负担的贷款都高于房产价值，有些经济学家呼吁对大量抵押贷款进行再融资或是将其抹掉一部分。但无论是布什政府还是奥巴马政府，他们都未发现这样做的回报能超过他们为此付出的经济和政治代价。他们的批评者则认为这种过分的谨慎延长了房产市场的萧条，拖慢了经济复苏的速度。

        In Europe, there was a reluctance to appear to be rewarding profligate peripheral economies (see Lesson three) by forgiving their debts. That left banks burdened with government bonds that may not be paid 100 cents on the euro. It forced debtor governments to sharply cut spending and raise taxes, threatening a downward spiral in which government belt-tightening exacerbates recessions that, in turn, make government deficits bigger.

        欧洲则不甚愿意免除欧元区外围国家（参见教训三）的债务，因为这样做会显得自己似乎是在奖励这些国家肆意挥霍。这使得欧洲银行业面临着政府所欠其债务可能无法全额偿还的风险。。这还迫使负债的政府大幅削减开支和加税，它具有引发恶性循环的风险：政府的紧缩政策加剧了衰退，衰退反过来又使政府的财政赤字上升。

        Lesson six:Go for long-acting, time-release fiscal policy.

        教训之六：采取效果持久、随时间推移逐渐发挥作用的财政政策。

        With hindsight, the composition of the small Bush fiscal stimulus of 2008 and the big Obama fiscal stimulus of 2009 weren't suited to the problem. (See Lesson one.) Giving temporary tax cuts (as both administrations did) or providing tax incentives to buy houses and cars gave the economy a temporary lift. But that wore off and left the economy struggling. Had Congress been willing, a smarter stimulus would have been less 'timely, targeted and temporary' (Lawrence Summers's January 2008 prescription) and more 'speedy, substantial and sustained' (his November 2008 prescription.) More money for infrastructure, for instance, would have provided a longer-lasting lift to the economy.

        事后看来，布什政府在2008年的小规模财政刺激举措和奥巴马政府2009年刺激举措的具体措施不适于解决当时的问题。（参见教训一。）临时减税（两届政府均采取了该举措）或是为购房购车提供减免税优惠使经济得到了短暂的提振，但其效果逐渐消退，使得经济发展举步维艰。假如国会同意的话，更明智的刺激举措本该是没那么“及时，有针对性和临时性”的措施（劳伦斯•萨默斯(Lawrence Summers)在2008年1月提出的解救方法），它们应该是更加“迅速、大规模和持续”的措施（萨默斯在2008年11月提出的方案）。比如说，如果当初向基础设施投入更多资金，本可能给经济发展带来更长久的提振。

        Lesson seven: Have an exit strategy and explain it.

        教训之七：要有退出策略并要需加以解释。

        There is still a nagging worry that this is going to end badly, and that can lead businesses, consumers and politicians to hold back and hurt the economy. Big companies continue to build an enormous cash hoard as if they're preparing for catastrophe. Politicians, wearied by their own diatribes about deficits, opt for immediate and premature austerity because they can't agree on ways to cope with the real problem, the rising spending on benefits in the future.

        大家依然在不停地担忧形势将以悲惨结局收场，这将导致企业、消费者和政界人士束手束脚并因此伤及经济发展。大企业在继续囤积大量现金，彷佛它们正在为巨大灾难做准备一般。政界人士则受到他们自身对赤字的抨击所累，选择了即时和时机未成熟的财政紧缩举措，因为他们无法就如何应对真正的问题达成一致意见。这一问题是福利支出未来会不断增长。

        The Fed has spelled out its exit strategy, telling markets what has to happen before it raises interest rates and outlining a plan for shrinking its $3 trillion portfolio someday. But no one can be sure the Fed will get it right or have the political fortitude to move soon enough.

        美联储已经阐明了其退出策略，告知市场在其开始加息前会发生什么情况，它还制定出了在未来某个时候着手缩减其规模达3万亿美元的资产负债表的计划。但是，没有人能肯定美联储会做好这件事或是具备迅速采取行动的政治勇气。

        As one wag put it recently, Ben Bernanke sees the exit; he just doesn't know how to get there.

        正如一个爱开玩笑之人最近所言，贝南克看到了出口，他只是不知道如何到达出口。